On Rationalities of Terrorism from an Eastern Perspective by Dahal, Bimal
Bimal Dahal   13
ON RATIONALITIES OF TERRORISM FROM  
an easTeRn PeRsPecTiVe
Bimal Dahal 
Payap University, Chiang Mai, Thailand
ABstrACt
This paper will investigate to what extent dominant 
conceptions of rationality can contribute to the understanding 
of extreme violent human behavior like terrorism. Second, 
it will explore rationalities outside of the Western tradition. 
Finally the paper explores the application of these ideas 
to understanding terrorism in the context of Nepal. It will 
demonstrates that rationalities are culturally relativistic. 
As the cultures are often in a process of development, so 
are the rationalities. From this point of view, understanding 
terrorist rationalities demands a contextual analysis of the 
complex cultural components and their constant change 
and development. 
rationalities: traveling across Conceptions
Rationality is one of the chief characters of terrorism. Contrary 
to the popular belief, Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, 
assert that terrorists are not irrational in such a way that they cannot be 
deterred; rather they are rational “to choose strategies that best advance 
them. The resort to terror tactics is itself a strategic choice of weaker actors 
with no other means of furthering their cause.”1 After a serious survey 
on the contemporary incidences of terrorism, Martha Crenshaw reports, 
“There is an emerging consensus that suicide attacks are instrumental in 
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or strategic from the perspective of a sponsoring organization . . . They 
serve the political interests of identifiable actors, most of whom are 
non-states opposing well-armed states. This method is mechanically 
simple and tactically efficient.”2 There are many supporting arguments 
in favor of the rationality of terrorism.  But the question is what these 
rationalities are. Is there any theory of rationality which could be 
utilized to understand terrorism? How about the empirical understanding 
of rationalities to be employed in terrorism studies? In this regard, 
one end of the discussion simply rejects the presence of any rationality 
in terrorism, branding them just “crazy” or emotional agents. Whereas, 
many others agree that terrorists have rationalities of their own which 
could be understood scientifically under specific condition in which 
terrorism breeds. To demystify the complexities of terrorism decision 
making, various notions of rationalities need to be considered. 
The following aims to chart basically three prominent approaches 
to rationality from the perspective of terrorism studies. First, Weberian 
concepts of instrumental rationality and its implications for terrorism 
decision making will be critically discussed. Thenceforth, two other 
prominent concepts of rationality--bounded rationality and communicative 
rationality--will be examined in the context of terrorism.
instrumental rationality
Rationality is one of the major themes in Max Weber’s oeuvre. Out 
of his topologies of rationality the instrumental and the value rationalities 
are highly employed to understand terrorist rationalities. Instrumental 
rationality adheres to the notion of cost benefit aspect of human action. 
According to this notion, a rational human agent is informed of the 
practical realities of life and determines the most cost efficient means 
to achieve desired ends. From this perspective, terrorism is rational if it 
helps the actor efficiently achieve his goal which is more valuable than the 
means employed. That is to say, terrorism can be a means for a rational 
actor to achieve a desired end if it is instrumentally efficient.
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But, the ends of terrorism are different at different levels of 
operation. At the organizational level, the goals are often tangible like 
achieving political power, inciting provocation, encouraging recruitment 
drives, consolidation of the organization, strengthening the position of the 
group at the bargain table or even derailing the ongoing peace process. 
At the individual level, however, the goals are not necessarily the same 
as they are at the organizational level. An individual might be motivated 
by different goals than the goals of the terrorist organization. Individual 
goals may include desire for martyrdom, redemptive violence, dignity, 
personal gain in rank of the terrorist organization, self-esteem, personal 
revenge, love, among others. Hence, the goal is often determined by the 
psychological factors of the actor concerned, which does not necessarily 
respect the tradeoff situation, particularly in terrorist actions that involve 
factors other than economics. 
Other situational factors also influence terrorist rationalities in 
instrumental sense of understanding. For example, if the targets are 
vulnerable and symbolic in nature, terrorist actions are commissioned 
“rationally” in order to yield propaganda which could be further utilized to 
strengthen their position in the political struggle against the government. 
Terrorist attacks on such symbolic targets send a message to the public 
that the government is not strong enough to protect the public and its 
honorable institutions, therefore such attacks are sanctioned expecting 
public support and recruitment drives.  But the situation may change if such 
targets are hard and are not of symbolic significance. Together with this, 
the symbolic value of the target and the cost of the attack depending upon 
its severity are also perceived by different people in different ways. What 
a terrorist values symbolically may not be valuable to the government, 
and cost involved in terrorism is also influenced by the understanding 
of the parties concerned. For example, the cost of a human life would 
be substantial for a democratic government, but very little for a terrorist 
organization relative to the outcome that it would generate.
The availability of incentives and opportunities, to a great extent, 
determines terrorist action. Within this framework, a terrorist’s decision 
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making involves the availability of the opportunity to attack a certain 
target and the incentives associated with such attacks. In some cases, 
from rational perspective, terrorist organizations can employ abstract 
notions of symbolic value like religion, ethnicity, nationalism, caste, 
regionalism, instrumentally for the sake of power and propaganda. 
In many other cases, they may employ a calculative approach from 
economic point of view. Frey and Luechinger attempted to explain the 
likelihood of terrorism incidences on the basis of demand, marginal benefit 
to terrorist, and supply, and marginal cost.3 
Nonetheless, instrumental rationality can be manipulated within 
the framework of means-ends dynamics. It does not explain terrorist 
actions under various conditions. For example, if means required to 
achieve certain ends are not available, then the terrorists have to redefine 
their ends that can be achieved by the available means. Or they have to 
look for appropriate means that could help them achieve the preconceived 
ends. In another case, they need to change the whole operational endeavor 
to accommodate the prevailing socio-political situation. Hence, efforts 
to understand and predict terrorist actions from an instrumentally 
rational point of view do not offer a comprehensive cue. Terrorists can 
act according to their own evaluation and understanding of the situation 
in question. Additionally, such econometric speculation has little space 
particularly when the actors of terror are ready to kill, and if necessary, 
die for their political ideals. Joseph Raz (2005) argues this type of 
tendency in terrorist organization in the framework of the “facilitative 
principle”, which states: if one has a sufficient reason to pursue an end, 
one also has a reason to take any course of action that facilitates that 
end.4  Hence, ends determine the means offering rationalizations to take 
a certain course of action. 
 The Weberian concept of rationality has been interpreted by 
different actors for different purposes. Many of them understood 
rationality as the “disenchantment of the world,” bureaucratization, or an 
increasing lack of freedom, that is in opposition to the emotive impulses 
of human beings. Many others understood Weberian rationality as 
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an increasing pervasiveness of the means-end (zweckrational) type of 
social action.5 Some of them even tried to understand Weberian rationality 
within a specific sphere of life like religion.  Additionally, Weber’s own 
inconsistent use of the term “rationality” throughout his prominent works 
such as Economy and Society and the Collected Essays in the Sociology 
of Religion” is more likely to “mystify than to illuminate”, notes Stephen 
Kalberg.6 
Various decision-making models based on instrumental rationality 
have only focused on the economic aspect of rationality. One of them is 
rational choice theory which is considered “the most powerful paradigm 
in the political science discipline.”7 Instrumental models have been widely 
used in predicting and deterring terrorist actions. However, they have 
not been able to address terrorism in an efficient manner. It is primarily 
because they have failed to emphasize its multivalent embodiment, 
to explain how individuals can be motivated by the instrumental principle 
or utility maximization. Though they provide a scientific basis for 
explaining political decision-making by providing casual explanation 
of political phenomenon, they do not explain how decisions are made. 
Normally decisions are made on the basis of a real or perceived value 
of the terrorists, which are not understood by others. The instrumental 
model assumes that choice can be predicted,  but it does not say anything 
about the choices terrorists have. While the model recognizes that human 
actions are guided by the desire, preference or beliefs that are consistent, 
it does not explain the causes of those desires, preferences and beliefs. 
For these reasons, the instrumental rational model is inadequate to explain 
such a decision-making process. Additionally, it also does not differentiate 
between political decisions and economic decisions. In terrorism studies, 
motivational factors are of great importance in making decision which 
cannot be predicted by mathematical or economic model.8  Weber argues:
18   Prajñā Vihāra
To apply the result of this analysis [means-ends analysis] 
in the making of a decision, however, is not a task that 
science can undertake; it is rather the task of the acting, 
willing person; he weighs and chooses from among the 
values involved according to his own conscience and his 
personal view of the world.9 
Bounded rationality
Employing the idea of rationality to predict human decision making 
(which was promoted by mainstream economic theory) portrayed human 
agents as fully rational Bayesian maximizers of subjective utility. This 
notion was further utilized in game theory, statistics and other disciplines 
to predict human action including terrorism.  But Herbert Simon has 
argued that the action of the individual is not necessarily based on fully 
rational choices. Rather, decision making is a search process guided by 
aspiration levels that satisfy the subject. Since aspiration levels are not 
fixed, but dynamically adjusted to the situation, decisions are also made 
to achieve a satisfaction level which is not constant. Therefore, decision 
making process is not fixed; rather it is guided by bounded rationality. 
Rationality in the instrumental sense requires unlimited cognitive 
capabilities, which is not available to human beings.  They do not 
know everything all the time and are not capable to utilize the available 
information to construct optimal decision making.  It is because the 
individual in question may not be sufficiently focused, adequately 
informed or capable to know and utilize the available information in 
the maximal pursuit of rationality. Therefore, human actions can better 
be explained through bounded rationality than purely instrumental 
rationality.10
According to this notion, people act not to maximize their self-
interest (as accepted by conventional decision-making models). Rather, 
in real life situations, human action is dependent upon a contexts that 
demand a typical response which could even be irrational. It is a sort 
of non-optimizing adaptive behavior of real people. Out of the limited 
resources, computational skills, time limitations, effective emotional 
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strengths and cognitive limitations, a subject makes decision which, 
according to his/her own belief system, satisfies his/her contextual 
needs. Therefore, bounded rationality assumes that human action is not 
instrumentally rational in economic terms; rather it is bounded by other 
factors that influence decision making process.  Sometimes human beings 
act out of the “weakness of will” knowing that specific action leads to 
harmful consequences. It is bani- that is habit or addiction in English, or 
lachari that dictates human actions in many circumstances. For example, 
an individual may know that heavy alcohol drinking invites serious health 
complications. Knowing the bad consequences of drinking alcohol he 
may not be able to resist the temptation of drinking more and more. 
This typical action of the individual does not maximize his self-interest but 
he keeps on repeating this action – drinking alcohol in his everyday life.
In terrorism studies, understanding the notion of bonded rationality 
can offer an important cue to understand terrorist violence. For example, 
a terrorist may know that killing people in a bus terminal might not serve 
his interest. Rather, it would attract the attention of the authorities towards 
him or his family. And his life would be more miserable and uncertain 
than before. But, he commits violence in response to his subjective 
understanding of the situation and his compulsive impulse which prefers 
acting against better judgement – a term known as akrasia in the ancient 
Greek lexicon.
In the same way, contemporary terrorist leaders are more aspirational 
than operational. The organizational structure of terrorism often lacks 
a unity of command and operation. In this situation, contemporary actors of 
terrorism are often autonomous. They are likely to take action according to 
their own perception of the situation and what they believe that enhances 
their goal. Under such cases, terrorist actions are aspirational-adaptive 
than utility maximizers, where beliefs have secondary role in decision 
making. For example, in suicide terrorism in the Islamic world, many 
believe that they would gain rewards in the afterlife for sacrificing their 
life for Islam. But very few put their lives at risk. Similar cases are also 
found in revolutionary terrorism in developing world. For example, 
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to die for a higher human cause or justice or for the nation is considered 
to be morally acceptable in revolutionary terrorism. Those who sacrifice 
their lives for such causes are revered as martyrs who are considered to 
be immortal. Many people believe this line of thinking, but most refrain 
from engaging in terrorism at the cost of their lives. Additionally, terrorist 
leaders often encourage others to die for causes, but they hardly put 
their own lives at risk. In such situations, the context, in guiding human 
action, is more important than what one believes. The notion of bounded 
rationality tends to involve all these ingredients in understanding decision 
making; however, it is not of much practical use. It tends to be a catch-all 
category explaining deviations from maximizing rationality;11 it does not 
help predict terrorist action that involves various culturally constrained 
habits, beliefs, and resources. 
Under the rubric of bounded rationality, a rational agent is 
goal-oriented but bounded, who decides on an action in the light of the 
contextual variables. But, how a subject decides is a complex phenomenon. 
For example, a subject can decide what to think about, but not what to 
think. In the same way, the result of thinking is a conscious, while the 
process of thinking is, to a great extent, unconscious. This unconscious 
is not even accessible to introspection. To understand the process of 
thinking, which subsequently leads to decision making, understanding 
the underlying psychic structure of the subject becomes an imperative. 
The psychological structure of a subject is, to a great extent, influenced by 
various socio-cultural as well as economic factors having both historical 
as well as future oriented dimensions. The idea of bounded rationality 
hereby does not offer practical solutions to understand the making of 
decision-making process so that terrorist actions could be predicted in 
advance. However, it sets a stage to explore further into the terrorist’s 
mindset focusing cultural ingredients that create terrorists. 
Communicational rationality 
The two dominant aforementioned types of rationalities seem to 
have been entirely dependent on the philosophy of the subject. In the case 
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of instrumental rationality the subject evaluates tradeoffs that maximize 
utility; whereas bounded rationality argues to involve contextual variables 
that bound the subject. Hence, subject-centered notion of rationality not 
only obscures but also blocks the way to understand the intrinsic inter-
subjective and dialogical character of communicative action, which, as 
Rasmussen points, “is victimized by its own instrumental formulation”.12 
Jürgen Habermas, a second generation scholar of Frankfurt School, 
building upon the works of Horkheimer and Adorno’s critical theory, 
offers an alternative approach to understand rationality free from the 
domination of subjectivity.  He argues that there is no “pure” rationality; 
rather it is embedded in the complexities of communicative action and 
in the structure of the lived-in world. This explanation leaves behind 
the conventional understanding of rationality from Marxist paradigm 
consisting of means of production, the base structure in Marxist lexicon, 
as the key for reconstructing history. It also negates the evolutionary 
aspect of human rationality in Weberian term. Alternatively, it offers a 
new paradigm, a paradigm of communication, the super-structure as the 
basis of social reproduction.  
Habermas classifies human action into four forms: teleological 
action, norm-regulated action, dramaturgical action, and communicative 
action. Each form of human action is guided by specific interest of the 
person or the community. Each form employs its own set of rationalities 
which adheres to the prevailing degree of knowledge, moral justification 
and legal norms of a particular society. Hence, rationality of an action 
depends upon the reliability of knowledge embodied in it. In the 
same manner, the moral codes and normative legal frameworks of the 
community dictate human rationality. 
Additionally, Habermas offers a notion of three worlds: the 
objective world, the social world, and the subjective world. He argues 
that individual or collective human action is guided on the basis of the 
quality of relationship of the actors to these three worlds. If the actor is 
interested primarily in the objective world, then he/she chooses appropriate 
instrumental means to achieve desired ends in the real-life situation. 
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But those interested in subjective and social world can have their own 
ways of achieving ends. Hence, rationality in a human action depends 
upon the perception or relative importance of the worlds from the actor’s 
perspective. 
In the same way, human actions are dependent upon the nature 
of the actors as well. If the actor seeks “success” then he/she tends to 
be more objective and instrumental without regarding the interests of 
the others. In general sense, teleological human actions are motivated 
by a “success” drive. In terrorism, the duty of a man in one’s lifetime, 
rewards in the afterlife, moral imperatives, liberation, and moksa are 
interpreted as teleological functions, therefore they demands strict 
objective commitment. But an understanding seeking actor, a social actor, 
however, in communicative action  acts to solve a certain problems on 
the basis of learning, both at individual and collective levels, to develop 
common understanding by arguments, consensus, and cooperation rather 
than strategic action to realize their specific goal.13 In another word, a 
social actor aims to seek consensus in communication which constructs 
his/her rationality for a particular action.
When a subject engages in a communicative act, he/she claims 
something – validity claims – that are understandable to all those in the 
system of communication, which could be approved or denied by others 
with whom the subject communicates. The conflicts in communication 
may arise as long as there are disagreements in respect of the validity 
claims which are resolved by “the force of the better argument” in the 
communication process. Reason in communicative action deals with 
the validity claims, which are of three types: (1) cognitive-instrumental 
reason, (2) moral-practical reason, and (3) aesthetic-expressive reason. 
The first type predicts and controls the realm of science through the 
interplay of practices and theories; the second type applies to moral and 
political deliberations; and the third type governs arts and literature.14 
In terrorism studies, the second type is important. It offers rationality 
for a certain action that is considered to be moral. In a broader sense, it 
offers rationalities even for a violent action, including terrorism, within 
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the framework of moral or ethical justification.
However, the point to focus is that the process of justification 
is not universal. Rather, it varies from culture to culture and philosophy 
to philosophy. Many processes are unique in nature which cannot be 
employed to justify various types of validity claims. For example, if one 
claims that it is raining; this claim can be justified by looking outside 
through the window. But a claim like federalism is counterproductive 
for a land-locked country like Nepal and cannot be justified in the same 
manner. In the same way, making consensus through communicative 
action demands similarities of the agents and situational constraints. 
Some people from a particular culture are likely to reach at an acceptable 
agreement through discussion, but many others prefer no discussion.15 
Likewise, communication does not necessarily promote understanding 
through discussion. It is culturally relativistic. Many actors are likely to 
misunderstand each other than to understand while communicating.16 
It follows that the notion of communicative rationality does not say much 
about the power inherent in communicating agents. A powerful agent can 
manipulate meanings and arguments to its favor. Thus, understanding 
reality through rationalities inherent in communication could be one of 
the many ways to understand reality, but not the only way. There may 
be multiple agents with a variety of cultural backgrounds resulting in 
complex situations offering various types of constraints. In such situations, 
exploring rationality as communicative action reflects only a part of the 
entire picture which cannot be theorized for diverse human actions. 
problematizing rationalities of terrorism 
What is the utility of the contemporary theories of rationality in 
understanding terrorism decision making? The answer is not simple. 
It depends upon the type of terrorism, the type of terrorist agent, and many 
other things that terrorism involves in its development. Hence, counter 
questions could be: which terrorism? Which terrorist? For example, urban 
revolutionary terrorists tend to attack soft targets due to their vulnerability 
and easy access. Hence, counterterrorism tactics to secure the target may 
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drive the terrorists to decide or rationalize another course of action. But 
a Jihadist would not care much about his or her life if there is a chance 
of success to strike at the head of the enemy, or even to attempt an attack 
is valuable in itself. In the same way, tightening security measures at 
airports with the establishment of metal detectors and screening devices 
may influence terrorist decision making. In such cases, terrorists may 
change tactics, not motives. Recent terrorist attacks in shopping malls 
and passenger buses suggest that terrorists act out of motivation derived 
from different sources. Some motives are inherent in socio-cultural factors, 
whereas many others are derived from historical as well as personality 
factors of the individuals involved in terrorism. Commonly, an ardent 
motive to strike against an enemy--real or perceived--derives its rationality 
from the socio-psychological factors upon which terrorism grows. These 
socio-psychological factors are culturally relativistic, therefore, they 
vary culture-wise. A comprehensive approach to understanding terrorist 
rationality is, therefore, not feasible from this perspective, because 
every culture has a unique set of rationalities for terrorism which resist 
generalization. 
 Practitioners and academics often employ Weberian model 
of rationality in understanding terrorism, and it is sometimes helpful. 
However, it ceases to function when there is value conflict. Instrumental 
rationality does seem to function as long as it is shielded from value 
conflict. In economics, where consumers are considered informed 
human beings, their actions are usually instrumentally rational. But, 
in cases involving struggles for liberation, dignity, love or similar goals 
involving passion and memories, such an approach does not work. People 
value things differently. Values may conflict with others, or remain 
irreconcilable. And when there is an irreconcilable value conflict, choice 
tends not to be rational but seemingly arbitrary. 
The mainstream literary canon does not shed enough light to the 
conceptions of rationality that are applicable in terrorist decision making. 
However, Weber’s notion of irreconcilability of values can lead scholars 
and practitioners to see rationalities outside of the Weberian model, 
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particularly the instrumental model.  
Thomas Kuhn offered an alternative theory of rationality through 
his influential work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962.17 
According to this theory, the rational must conform to the actual. 
The structure upon which rationality is based can accommodate minor 
theoretical changes in this situation. However, there still exists a chance of 
revision and wholesale rejection the total structure, called the “paradigm” 
in Kuhn’s word, whenever the scientific community faces problems in 
solving certain questions. 
As the scientific community faces more problems in solving the 
outstanding questions by employing the existent paradigm, it passes the 
community into a state of crisis. Thenceforth, the community debate 
actively both offering a new paradigm and justifying the old one. 
The debate will continue until a new paradigm is established or the old 
one retains its dominance to solve the problem in question. 
In many cases, the proponents of different paradigms are unable to 
communicate with each other because of their different set of exemplars 
and world views. Even if they communicate, the point is, in justifying 
their respective paradigms; both the communities try to reassert their 
own paradigm. Thus, according to Kuhn, there is incommensurability 
between paradigms, making it irrational to choose between paradigms. 
But, the theory of revolutionary science does not strictly prove 
that the proponents of two paradigms do not understand each other at all. 
Since rationality is a rule-governed process and scientific process itself, 
therefore, is a cumulative one, it would be inappropriate to assume that 
a new paradigm evolves independently only because of the accumulation 
of anomalies in the old paradigm. Rather, a transition from one paradigm 
to another involves an inclusive transformation that enhances the 
problem solving ability of the scientific community. However, there 
exists incommensurability about values between paradigms, which is 
particularly important in understanding social phenomena because of the 
availability of multiplicities of the values sprouted out of the pluralities 
of the cultures.
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Various other thinkers of the Western tradition agree with the 
multiplicity of rationalities in cultures. Rationality derived from the 
absolute notion of truth has been critically scrutinized by thinkers like 
Richard Rorty. According to this point of view, there are various notions of 
truth depending upon the community. Whenever two or more communities 
come together consensually, they do agree to recognize something as 
“true,” which would be “untrue” in other communities and at another 
time and space. Therefore, in complex social situations, Rorty asks to 
“redescribe” the situation which means speaking differently, rather than 
arguing well. For, arguing in the same tradition does not offer a chance to 
unearth entrenched rationalities that have been silenced by the dominant 
discourse. In the same line of thinking, Alasdair MacIntyre insists scholars 
to see rationality in traditions which vary greatly across cultures. Thus, 
an emerging belief in the Western tradition is that, there is no rationality 
as such. Rather, there are rationalities in cultures which can be understood 
in their own respective contexts. 
understanding terrorism in nepal
Notable Eastern approaches to rationality are not much different 
than the Western. For Example, Manusmriti understand rationality not as 
a universal entity, rather a particular entity which depends upon the actor, 
assigned profession, the time or stage of life and the space. Rationality 
of a male agent of a higher caste would be different than that of a female 
of the same caste. It further depends upon their stage of life. If a person 
is at student stage (bramhacharya), his action must be directed to attain 
education, whereas house holder (grihasta) strives to earn wealth. Actions 
that enable individuals to attain their respective goals at their respective 
stages are considered to be rational. 
Another important point to note in understanding the rationality 
of terrorism is the role of motivators. Most of the agents of a terrorist 
organization are not autonomous and well informed. Rather, they just 
follow their leaders. It is a belief that involves a sense of belonging, 
justice, dignity, solidarity, truth, and above all ultimate purpose of life. 
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Whenever they receive orders from authority, they act without considering 
its rationality or its consequences. They derive rationality from the 
authoritative figure. In an ancient text Mahabharata, the most skillful 
archer, Ekalabya even cuts his thumb off when he was asked to do so 
by his Guru, Dronacharya. This phenomenon from Mahabharata can be 
equated with the modern suicide bombers in terrorism studies. From this 
perspective, terrorists believe something or someone as ideal and just, 
and this justifies their following of orders. 
In the same line of thinking, the position of Guru in the Eastern 
society is venerable, one no less than a god. The Guru-Sysya (master– 
disciple) tradition is as old as Vedic tradition, called parampara in 
Nepalese lexicon. An established parampara is called a sampradaya, 
sect or cult. In the Vedic tradition, a Guru often hands down knowledge 
and wisdom to his disciples orally, shruti, through sutras, or formulas. 
This tradition reached its height during the upanishadic period, when 
a disciple is supposed to receive wisdom only at the presence of the Guru. 
The term Upanishad means “to sit down near” a Guru.18 This tradition 
is dominant in the Eastern religions like Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism 
and Sikhism, and it has transcended the religious boundaries to influence 
human behavior in economics, politics and other institutions. In terrorism 
studies, the presence of various parampara and sampradaya in Eastern 
society offers a way of constructing a rationality for violence according 
to the goals and interests of the Guru concerned. Since there are many 
parampara and sampradaya, there are many gurus of each parampara 
and sampradaya. Each Guru may have his own perception of reality and 
goals, which may rationalize terrorism in their own way. 
A Guru is often a male who is blindly trusted to lead the disciples 
towards perfection or happiness or moksa. In general, there is a single 
Guru with many disciples in a certain sect or cult. The disciples have to 
be unquestionably faithful to the Guru; however, they do not necessarily 
need to be faithful to their fellow comrades. Therefore, any command 
from the Guru is executed without question, because there is no space for 
discussion of the command issued by the Guru at the level of the disciples. 
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Hence, disciples are exempt from the fruit of their actions, for the Guru 
is supposed to bear the responsibility on his own. Acts of terrorism to 
execute the command of the Guru is a considered a rational act in such 
communities or sects. 
There are many gods and goddesses in Hindu cosmology together 
with personal gods known as iswara. So are there many Gurus in the 
Hindu tradition in a certain structured hierarchy. Many personal gods 
are stationed around the Supreme God. In the same way, gurus are also 
organized in a fixed hierarchical structure. The position of a certain Guru 
depends upon his distance from the main power center. If a Guru is nearer 
to the power center, he is considered more powerful. Whenever there is 
a dispute about the decision of a guru in a certain society, people opt to 
consult another guru of higher order to resolve the conflict. To execute 
an act of violence against a real or perceived enemy, the command from 
the guru of higher order is effective. Hence, terrorists often derive their 
rationalities for violence from the hierarchy of the Gurus.  
Each Guru may have his own world view which may contradict 
the others. Whenever there is a confrontation between gurus in their 
understanding of the world and beyond, a certain Guru may declare another 
Guru an enemy, and commands his followers to fight against the declared 
enemy to save their religion, and sometimes to purify the tradition. In such 
a situation, followers of a certain Guru employ whatever means possible to 
“punish” the followers of another Guru. In some cases, a Guru interprets 
a certain event or a natural phenomenon in such a way that draws a clear 
demarcation line between communities or classes. The Guru may demand 
a certain act in favor of his sect from the other communities or classes. 
And if the target community does not comply, then the Guru declares 
that community as “evil”.19 In this situation, an extreme act of violence, 
terrorism, is a rational act in defending one’s own Guru. 
A Guru is influential within a certain social and geographical 
territory. But a Guru as a human being is a mobile entity as well. They 
move from place to place to preach or to explore better living opportunites 
commonly known as sukha and santi (happiness and peace) in this life. 
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Whenever a Guru travels, it happens to invade another Guru’s territory. 
Hence, the territory includes not only geographical or sociological, 
rather it also involves cultural and spiritual territory.  At this point, sects 
of two or more Gurus collide. In some cases, they are able to negotiate 
peacefully, but in many cases, they employ means of extreme violence 
to exterminate the influence of the other declaring them as the enemy of 
their gods. Act of terrorism to defend one’s own territory or to invade 
other’s territory is a rational act from this perspective, because both the 
terrorists are doing their god’s work.
Hierarchical caste-based society of the Eastern tradition categorizes 
human beings on the basis of their birth.20 Accordingly, it assigns duties 
and responsibilities together with an ultimate aim of life to an individual 
suited for a particular stage of life and inheritance (see Table 3.1). If there 
is a goal of life, there must be a method to realize that goal. An individual 
ought to do something to meet his/her desired ends. Hence, rationality is 
useful for an individual to achieve the goals prescribed by the tradition 
in order to enhance his position in the society. 
However, such goals are dynamic depending upon the acts of an 
individual in question. Additionally, there exists a chance for inter caste/
class mobility, or to move upward in the archeology of the society by 
opting for a better goal which is not prescribed to the individual on the 
basis of his birth or genealogy. It means an individual of lower order can 
improve his situation in the society if he successfully achieves the goals 
of higher order prescribed by the tradition to an individual of higher 
order.  Hence, the most powerful indicator of success is wealth. Wealth 
makes everything possible, both kama and moksa. This drive for wealth 
to upgrade one’s own status and dignity in the society offers rationalities 
for individuals to embrace even extreme acts of violence that constitutes 
terrorism. 
For example, a poor person of higher caste may descend the social 
ladder if he is unable to attain the goals of his life. Likewise, a rich man of 
lower caste may move towards higher order if he has sufficient purusastra, 
particularly wealth. And the rule of the game is: the higher the order, the 
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nobler the man. So, individuals strive to attain the goals of life to maintain 
their position in society. This notion of becoming a better man by doing 
something extraordinary or valuable in society motivates individual to 
pursue certain acts deemed to be instrumental. Popular culture and media 
often reinforce this world view, particularly in Nepal where Bollywood 
movies are influential in constructing such world views in the public. 
In this process, any means, irrespective of its ethical or moral consequences, 
is acceptable as long as it helps individuals attain the desired ends. 
But this social order frequently encourages the lower tiers of the society 
to employ violent means to attain social status that enables the individual 
to pursue happiness, which is otherwise impossible for the individuals 
of the lowers class. 
Caste
(verna)
Assigned 
profession
stages 
(Ashram)
Aim of life
(purusastra)
Brahmins Education Bramhacharya 
(Student)
Dharma
(knowledge)
Kshatriya Administrator/
military 
Grihasta
(householder)
Artha (wealth)
Vaisya Commerce Vanaprastha
(retired)
Kama(pleasure)
Sudra Service Sannyas
(renunciation)
Moksa(liberation)
No caste
To create and defend one’s class or caste territory is another aspect 
that offers rationalities for terrorism in the Eastern tradition. Hierarchical 
society constitutes different layers and tiers. At the core of this structure 
lies the state power that dictates all other forms of power. Individuals of 
different tiers strive to move towards the core power center both to uplift 
their situation in society and to achieve spiritual bliss. Spiritual bliss is 
reserved for those who have sufficient artha, or wealth. In this situation, 
a certain individual from the marginalized class employs selective verses 
of religious and philosophical texts to prove the existing state of affairs 
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is unjust and oppressive. Then, he motivates others outside the group to 
fight against the existing structure that oppresses them. Those convinced 
by his arguments form a group to wage war against the “unjust” 
discriminating social order. This group, launches attacks at various tiers 
of the social structure to weaken the boundaries that separate the different 
tiers. Once the structure is weak enough to allow these individuals to be 
included in a higher order, then a new group is formed at each tier involving 
the old members and the newcomers. This new group again launches 
attacks both within the group and outside of the group to consolidate their 
“achievements.” Hence, they reinforce the boundaries to “safeguard” the 
new tier and also to exclude the others as well. In so doing, they employ 
all measures, including terrorism. 
Buddhist notions of impermanence, annica, offer an alternative 
way to understand multiplicity of rationalities in the Eastern tradition. 
According to this notion, the world is changing every moment, so are its 
content, including human beings and their attitudes. Rationality cannot 
be understood in isolation; therefore, rationality of a man for violence is 
constantly changing with the changing world. A local Nepalese dialect 
reflects this notion:
Kunda kunda pani; Munda munda buddhi
(Water differs by ponds whereas the idea or intellect differs 
by heads)
As water of a certain pond cannot be the same as that of another, 
in the same way, the mind of a certain man cannot be the same as that 
of the other. In this light, the rationality applicable to a certain person 
cannot be applicable in the same way to another. So, every person has his/
her own rationality to act in a certain way. This notion can be useful in 
understanding terrorism: Every terrorist has his/her own way to rationalize 
violence under his/her own specific context.
Fatalism is another notion that dictates rationality in the Eastern 
tradition. According to this world view, every living being has its own 
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fate composed of two components: bhagya and karma. Bhagya is fortune, 
whereas karma is destiny. Everything happens to a man in this world is 
attributable to the dictates of bhagya or karma. If something happens well, 
then it is because of his fortune, or bhagya, otherwise it is because of his 
karma. Therefore, an individual is not responsible for his act, because he 
is simply observing his bhagya or karma. The idea of bhagya or karma 
is also related to the position of different celestial bodies during the 
time of the birth of the person and in his or her different life phases. It is 
commonly called graha (planet but not necessarily the planets of only the 
solar system). If the graha of a person is in favorable position, anything 
would yield good result. Everything may go waste or counterproductive 
when the grahas are in bad position. So, the act of a person is not an 
outcome of rationally calculated decision making process, but the one 
dictated by his or her grahas.
But the question may arise: how to know the position of graha? 
In many cases, it is something unknowable through conventional 
knowledge. Therefore, an individual is free to do anything if he or she 
thinks or believes it is appropriate to act in that particular way in that 
particular situation. In many cases, rituals are observed to make grahas 
favorable to the person in question. In this regard, graha santi puja 
(worship of planetary objects) is observed to receive blessings from 
graha. In decision making process the idea of graha plays important 
role because it rationalizes an act of a man, including an act of extreme 
violence, terrorism, as an outcome of some external consequences for 
which the actor is not solely responsible. An act of terrorism, is not only 
dependent on the will or interests of both the victim and the perpetrator, 
but because of the resultant consequences of their respective grahas. 
The position of the graha brings fortune, bhagya and karma, therefore 
one need not be worried towards the consequences of a certain act. 
In this respect, lekhanta (the end of the writing) is an important 
notion to understand. On the sixth day after the birth of a child, bhavi, 
the writer of the fate of the new born person, visits the baby and writes 
bhagya on his or her foreheads, which dictates his or her life until he or 
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she dies. The final lines of the writing describes the way that person is 
destined to die. If someone is murdered by an act of violence, then it is 
understood that the last lines of his fate was written in that way, so no 
one should feel guilt concerning the incident that killed the person in 
particular. In rationalizing terrorism, this notion offers scope to interpret 
the event in a particular way that reinforces the motive for terrorism.   
So, how a person derives rationalities for terrorism is not a 
universal phenomenon. Various traditions, both in the West and the East, 
have their unique ways for rationalizing terrorism. Both the Eastern and 
Western traditions acknowledge a diversity of rationalities across cultures. 
However, the dominant Western notions of rationality oversimplify it and 
tend to employ generalized notions insensitive to cultural differences. 
It further asserts that only human beings are capable of reason, therefore 
only human beings are rational.
The rationality that sanctions terrorism in a certain community 
also depends upon the structure of the community. At a certain point, 
rationality given by a certain tier of the community can be instrumental, 
but it may not remain so forever. Society is dynamic in nature, therefore 
the status of the individuals is also changing, and so are the rationalities. 
In a certain context, the speaker can become a listener, and the former 
listener can become a speaker. In this changed position, the rationalities 
also go through a changing process to suit the interest of the dominant 
group of that community.  Therefore, we need to ask questions like: Who 
is constructing rationalities in a society?  Why rationalities are constructed 
in that manner? Who is the actor or the speaker? Who is the follower or 
the listeners? What is the power relationship between the speaker and 
the listener? For whom do those sorts of rationalities benefit? For whom 
does it harm? How and why, under certain conditions, a certain set of 
rationalities are constructed more preferable than other rationalities? How 
are rationalities made functional in a certain community? 
Rationality does not exist outside the relationships constructed 
by the dominant knowledge and ideology of the society. This dominant 
knowledge is often constructed to serve certain interest of a certain group 
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in the community. The outsiders of the community often are informed 
about the dominant rationality that represents the interest of a particular 
group, whereas the operating rationality of the underclass remains 
obscure. In terrorism studies, the actors are often classified as oppressed 
or marginalized or the victims of injustice, who rarely get a chance to 
have their voice heard in the mainstream discourse. Since the studies on 
terrorism are also influenced by the social structure, many researchers tend 
to understand it through the eyes of the dominant discourse. Generally, 
the functional ingredients of terrorism are often collected, categorized, 
analyzed, and treated as rationality from the perspective of the dominant 
ideology; therefore, the rationalities and perspectives of terrorist actors 
are often ignored, or misrepresented by the mainstream discourse. 
So, which rationality is the authentic rationality? The rationality 
of the actor is the authentic one, because it offers a foundation for the act 
itself. Other sets of rationality are merely a representation of the same 
from particular perspectives. As every representation is misrepresentation, 
rationality represented by a certain theory of knowledge does not 
necessarily reflect the rationality that operates in the real world. Therefore, 
to understand the rationalities of terrorism of a certain terrorist group, 
it is important to understand it from its own context that involves its 
culture, history, belief systems and traditions. Since various methods 
to understand rationality of terrorism from the dominant perspective 
have become unable to offer practical expedients to predict and address 
terrorism effectively in the contemporary world, understanding it from 
within is an alternative way for both scholars and practitioners in the field 
of the terrorism studies. 
Conclusion
Rationality is a contentious issue to understand in terrorism studies. 
However, there have been tremendous attempts to understand it objectively 
from various perspectives. Prominent among them are the Western and 
the Eastern perspectives. 
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The dominant Western perspective to understand rationality of 
terrorism suffers from the European economistic determinism. It tends 
to understand the basis of a certain act, including that of terrorism, in its 
instrumental value to generate more benefit than the means employed. 
But the idea of benefit is conceived by the value given to that particular 
outcome. Value is often given to a certain outcome according to the beliefs 
and attitudes of the subjects in question. These beliefs and attitudes are 
culturally shaped. Disregarding the cultural components in shaping values 
fails to capture the real motivating factors behind a certain act. From such 
orientation, the Western approach fails to differentiate types of terrorists. 
It may be helpful to capture the rationalities of terrorists who are pursuing 
private or collective prosperity by employing terrorism instrumentally, but 
it is not sufficient to understand the rationalities of terrorists who act in 
selfless opposition to oppression, or to achieve their ultimate goals of life.
The Western tradition, however, tries to engage with the native 
voices to understand the rationalities of terrorism in a certain cultural 
context.  But the problem with this is that the Western scholars or 
Western educated scholars employ their own means or methods to see 
the social phenomenon through a Western lens. This tendency reinforces 
phenomena like colonization or globalization. Thus, the very Western 
ideas of rationality become canon for the production of knowledge to 
understand and control social endeavors in the East. In this way, native 
voices are silenced by the cacophony of dominant Western discourses, and 
the mainstream scholarship tend to endorse the “tested” Western models 
of rationality. This applies to the understanding of terrorism. 
“Home-grown” scholars and practitioners in the field of terrorism 
studies do also suffer from the Eurocentric views due to their scholarly 
or institutional relationships with the Western institution or body of 
knowledge. General patterns of scholarly enterprises in the third world 
are guided by the knowledge developed in the West. The scholars and 
the practitioners tend to test their theories developed in the West on the 
laboratory of the East, collaborating with institutions and scholars who 
are guided by the same Western lines of thinking. 
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For example, a team of scholars from the Western tradition visits 
or studies Eastern culture and trains his colleagues and students to analyze 
the issue from the same paradigm. Particularly in terrorism studies, most 
of the academicians as well as practicing institutions are from the Western 
hemisphere. Moreover, the funding and other financial and nonfinancial 
incentive to conduct that particular research influences the outcome. This 
is a type of scholarly adventurism. The outcome often serves Western 
interests in Eastern communities. Such types of investigation is not 
a recent. Rather, as Said notes, it has its roots in “the practice, the theory, 
and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant 
territory.”21 
Religious books like Vedas, Ramayana, Mahabharata, puranas, 
not only influence but guide human behavior in Indian subcontinent. 
These religious texts are ambivalent concerning violence. In addressing 
violence as a means to the ends, however, selective interpretations of 
these texts by ancient scholars like Manu, Kautilya and Kamandaka often 
encourage human beings to use violence in the pursuit of the objective 
of human life and to defend one’s own dharma.
This special condition of the Eastern community demands a 
closer view to understand what it means by the words like purusartha 
(objectives of human life) or dharma. These very ideas and ideals offer 
rationalities for actions which is considered to be unacceptable in other 
situations. But the problem again appears is that there are multiple layers 
in the Eastern social world. Each layer has its peculiar tradition that offers 
rationalities for violence which may not be compatible with the other. 
In such situations, an attempt to understand rationalities for violence in 
a certain tradition or sub-tradition cannot be comprehensive. Rather it 
may offer an explanation from a particular perspective which eventually 
fails to have universal validity.
The problems we discussed earlier concerning the role of the Guru 
apply to knowledge in general.  Individuals in a community often depend 
upon guidance of authority and are not well informed about ethical action 
at an individual level. They depend upon someone who is considered 
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to be more knowledgeable and who is venerated by the community as 
a good man. This person, as a guru, or a leader, determines the value or the 
course of action to attain particular set of values. In so doing, he appeals 
the community members to act in a certain way, sometimes including 
acts of terrorism, to achieve a better state of affairs for the community. 
Hence, terrorism derives its rationality, particularly operating rationality, 
from the leaders of the organization or the community.
In Nepalese context, understanding rationalities for terrorism 
invite multiple perspectives. The mainstream discourses on terrorism are 
heavily influenced by the Western tradition. Scholars outside of the West 
often find it easy to position their arguments in the light of the Western 
tradition. Various researches conducted with such views have not been able 
to shed enough light on the rationalities entrenched in various cultures and 
sub-cultures of Asia, including the Nepalese community. For this reason, 
they have not been able to offer practical tools for the practitioners to 
understand terrorism in the contemporary world. 
There have been few serious scholarly works in the field of 
terrorism studies in Nepal from a socio-psychological point of view 
involving culture as the basis of rationality. Many of the previous 
researches have attempted to explore relationships between terrorism and 
other sociological factors like poverty, literacy, age group, and in some 
cases, ethnicity and globalization. But their findings are contradictory 
in nature. They have been useful to reinforce conventional arguments 
about the particular instances of rationalities of terrorism, but they have 
not been able to offer some specific tools for effective counterterrorism 
strategies. The complex socio-political space of Nepal is evolving in such 
a way that conventional theories of social sciences have been unable to 
capture its dynamics. Bidhan Golay notes: 
Nepali history seems caught in a time warp where the same 
old hackneyed events unfailingly keep appearing in its 
unchanging form over and over again. For some strange 
reason the paradigm of social enquiry in the hills remains 
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ossified and immune to the world of social and cultural 
theories.22
Positioning the above arguments in the political space of Nepal, 
it is important to investigate the issue of rationality for terrorism from 
the contextual cultural perspective
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